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Abstract

Procurement represents a major operation for many organizations. In the quest to improve procurement
practices, some organizations have turned to implementing Information and Communication Technologies
(ICT). This exploratory study investigates some of the benefits presented by Reverse Auction, a procurement
tool that owes its very own existence to advancements in ICT. The framework “Reverse Auction StakeholderBenefit Grid” is proposed for understanding the numerous benefits of Reverse Auctions to the Seller and Buyer.
The study aims to provide practitioners and academic researchers with suggestions as to how the Reverse
Auction business model can be used to deliver benefits to sellers and buyers, creating a Win-Win situation in
the cut-throat world of online Business-to-Business Electronic Commerce.

Introduction
The lackluster performance of many Dotcoms in 2000 has dampened industry expectations towards the Electronic Commerce
industry, and the Digital Economy as a whole. However, all is not lost. Organizations from the Old Economy, which are
commonly known as the “brick and mortar” companies, are keen to use the Internet and other Information and Communication
Technologies (ICT) for Business-to-Business (B2B) purposes. Estimates and forecasts of the B2B Electronic Commerce arena
may vary on the magnitude of growth and adoption rate, but share the commonality of continuing growth in the coming few years
(Bermudez 2001). Such optimism in B2B Electronic Commerce is based on the belief that B2B Electronic Commerce is capable
of streamlining business processes, enhancing trading relationships, leading to reduced costs of doing business and improved
profitability in the longer term.
The commercialization of the Internet in the early and mid 1990's has triggered several innovative Electronic Commerce business
models. The traditional auctioneering mechanism which is widely used for selling off goods and services to the highest bidder
has been given a digital transformation, with several innovative electronic auction models being developed to leverage on the
availability of real-time, low-cost, high-capacity information exchange (Kambil and Van Heck 1998). While the name eBay has
become synonymous with online auctions, it is but only one of the several electronic auction models available today.
This paper focuses on the Reverse Auction electronic auction model. It is an online auctioneering mechanism which essentially
tips the traditional forward auction model upside-down. Instead of having the seller auctioneering goods (or services) to the
highest bidding buyer, the buyer hosts auction events to tender off contracts to the lowest bidding seller. This exploratory study
seeks to understand how various organizations stand to benefit from participating in Reverse Auctions. The Reverse Auction
Stakeholder-Benefit Grid is proposed as a framework for achieving this.
The study contributes to practitioners and academics by emphasizing that a Win-Win situation is necessary for organizations to
participate in innovative Electronic Commerce business models. The framework highlights incentives (benefits from Reverse
Auctions in this case) which may be used to create a Win-Win situation. Data from an ongoing study of a series of Reverse
Auctions conducted in Australia is used to guide the direction of research.
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The Reverse Auction Model for E-Business
The Reverse Auction model was first conceptualized by Glen Meakem in 1994 (Tully 2000). Subsequently, Meakem set up
Freemarkets Inc., which specializes in conducting Reverse Auctions for its clients. Research into the Reverse Auction
phenomenon is beginning to emerge (Emiliani 2000), but many articles are merely reporting the millions of dollars of savings
that can be attributed to Reverse Auctions (Brunelli 2000, Colvin 2000, Henke 2000, Kirby 2000). Some practitioners and
researchers are more critical. Henke (2000) suggests that organizations should not use Reverse Auction as a price-cutting tool,
whilst Emilliani (2000) concluded that implementing Reverse Auctions may delay the introduction of modern supply chain
management systems in organizations.
For the purpose of this study, Reverse Auction is treated as a mechanism which changes parts of existing practice in supplier
selection. Before the days of Reverse Auctions, the purchasing organization had to prepare a tender document, which was then
forwarded to existing and potential suppliers. Purchasing managers negotiate price, quantity, quality, delivery schedules,
payments, and other terms and conditions for the contract with the supplier’s marketing manager (Bensaou 1999). Depending on
the buyer’s supplier selection strategy, the negotiation process may be a round-robin process, whereby a supplier has only one
chance of negotiating and winning the contract (Barua et al. 1997); or the buyer may continually negotiate with several suppliers,
and keep going back to earlier suppliers to pressure them to match better deals offered by their competitors. Reverse Auctions
are expected to streamline the above-mentioned process by allowing suppliers to compete amongst themselves to win the tender
through real-time online bidding (Kaplan and Sawhney 2000, Kinney 2000, Kirby 2000, Sinha 2000, Thomas 2000).
Figure 1 illustrates negotiation in the traditional supplier selection process, where the buyer negotiates continuously with
individual seller before a successful seller is selected. The thick arrows represent the negotiation between the seller and buyer.
Briefly, the Reverse Auction process is a more disciplined
and standardized procedure. The buyer prepares a tender
document thoroughly. The tender document is sent out to
potential suppliers. Suppliers are required to respond to the
tender, to confirm their ability to meet these requirements
and adhere to the rules and regulations of the Reverse
Auction process. A trial auction is conducted prior to the real
auction to give suppliers some experience in online bidding.
On the actual day of the auction, suppliers login to an online
auction session. The auction is usually constrained by time.
Bidders are required to place bids in decremental steps to
win the tender. The winning bidder at the end of the online
auction session is the one who has placed the lowest bid at
the earliest instance. The winning bidder is then invited for
thorough post-auction negotiations to cement the deal. The
buying organization may negotiate a deal with the runner up
bidder if the winning bidder cannot satisfy its requirements
fully. A detailed description of the Reverse Auction process
is covered by Emilliani (2000).
Figure 2 illustrates the Reverse Auction supplier selection
process, whereby sellers compete amongst themselves in the
auction’s bidding process, with the buyer negotiating with
the winning bidder ultimately. The thin arrows represent the
bidding activities of the sellers, and the thick arrow
represents the negotiation between the buyer and the seller
with the winning bid.
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Figure 1. Traditional Supplier Selection Process
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Figure 2. Reverse Auction Supplier Selection Process

Reverse Auction and Stakeholder-Benefits
In a competitive marketplace, many organizations seek to improve internal and external business processes with the help of ICT
(Kambil and Van Heck 1998) to reduce the costs of doing business, which can lead to higher profitability. Reverse Auctions are
expected to improve the procurement process by reducing the costs of transaction, thus enabling organizations to buy and sell
products at market-determined prices. For organizations to trade with each other they must gain mutual benefit. The framework
that this paper proposes investigates Reverse Auction benefits to both buyers and sellers. The 7-phase Business Procurement Life
Cycle (Archer and Yuan 2000, p. 390) is adopted for describing the various stages of the procurement process. The seven phases
are in the following sequence:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Information gathering
Supplier contact
Background review
Negotiation
Fulfillment
Consumption, maintenance, and disposal
Renewal

An analysis of the Reverse Auction process identified several areas where a Reverse Auction could improve various phases of
the Business Procurement Life Cycle. The areas of benefit are separated into two main categories according to the stakeholder
involved, namely, Seller Benefits, and Buyer Benefits.

Reverse Auctions and Seller Benefits
The following are areas where sellers benefit from participating in an online Reverse Auction. These benefits are coded from A
to F, as summarized by Table 1.
A. Ability to access a level playing field
Sellers who participate in a Reverse Auction have the opportunity to operate in a fairer supplier selection process than before.
Supplier favoritism is greatly reduced since the Reverse Auction process is conducted in a disciplined, standardized and
structured manner. As long as the seller is capable of meeting the requirements specified by the buyer, it has a chance to
compete to win the tender. The bidding process gives every seller the opportunity to place its best offer forward. This benefit
is expected to be exhibited in phases 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 of the Business Procurement Life Cycle.
2001 — Seventh Americas Conference on Information Systems
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B. Ability to access an expanded market, less constrained by geographical and temporal barriers
In Reverse Auctions, sellers have the opportunity to bid for tenders without being constrained by temporal and geographical
separation. Very often, sellers do not have the resources to participate in tenders for supplies that are in regions beyond certain
geographical boundaries due to the high costs of participation. Participating in Reverse Auctions also gives the sellers more
exposure, leading to the buyer inviting them to participate in future contract tenders as their offerings become known and
their capabilities are appreciated. Sellers enjoy such exposure while incurring minimal marketing costs. This benefit is
expected to be exhibited in phases 1, 2 and 7 of the Business Procurement Life Cycle.
C. Opportunity to win bigger contracts in future
Continuing from the previous point, if the seller manages to win the tender, then it has a greater chance of supplying other
products, e.g. maintenance and support for the initial product. Put simply, by participating in Reverse Auctions, sellers who
are willing to compete aggressively stand to increase their opportunity to sell more to each customer, as well as selling to
more customers. This benefit is expected to be exhibited in phases 3, 4 and 7 of the Business Procurement Life Cycle.
D. Ability to respond to competition
The bidding process in Reverse Auctions allows sellers to respond to market competition. Reverse Auctions enable them to
consider their position in the market quickly, and to continually improve their internal cost structures to offer bids that would
either match or better the rivals’. The dynamic pricing nature (Kafka et al. 2000) of the bidding process gives the sellers a
snapshot of current market conditions, without having to rely on outdated predictions. It is expected that sellers gain benefit
in the negotiation phase (phase 5) of the Business Procurement Life Cycle.
E. Ability to improve production scheduling
Continuing from Point D, Reverse Auctions provide up-to-date market information to sellers, enabling them to schedule their
production cycles to maximize current market conditions, e.g. increase capacity to meet expected increase in market demand.
In addition, the pricing strategy can leverage on current market conditions. This benefit is expected to be observed in phases
6 and 7 of the Business Procurement Life Cycle.
F. Ability to increase business certainty
If the seller can convince the buyer that it is offering a superior bid in comparison to the rivals’, then it may even encourage
the buyer to extend the contract for a term which is longer than the initial intended period. Incidentally, Reverse Auctions
highlight the superiority of a bid, leading to extended business certainty for the winning seller. This benefit is expected to
impact phases 4 and 7 of the Business Procurement Life Cycle.
Table 1. Reverse Auction and Seller Benefits
Seller Benefits
Ability to access a level playing field
Ability to access an expanded market, less constrained by geographical and
temporal barriers
Opportunity to win bigger contracts in future
Ability to respond to competition
Ability to improve production scheduling
Ability to increase business certainty

Code
B
C
D
E
F

Reverse Auctions and Buyer Benefits
Reverse Auctions also benefit buyers. The following points highlight how these benefits impact on the various stages of the
Business Procurement Life Cycle, in aiding the understanding of how Reverse Auctions present opportunities to the buyer. As
summarized in Table 2, these five areas of benefits are coded V – Z.
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V. Ability to Standardize Procurement and Reduce Maverick Purchases
In order for buyers to convey their requirements clearly to potential sellers, the Reverse Auction process has to be regulated
by strict and standardized procedures. This is to prevent haphazard and undisciplined negotiations. The standardized
procedure allows for audits and reduces instances of favoritism towards any particular seller. The standardized nature of the
Reverse Auction procurement process encourages sellers to make their internal operations transparent to the buyer, thus
allowing buyers to select lean suppliers. The disciplined and standardized procedure also reduces maverick purchases by the
buyer. Every purchase has to undergo stringent evaluation. This type of benefit is expected to improve phases 1, 2, 3 and 4
of the Business Procurement Life Cycle.
W. Ability to Shorten the Negotiation Process
The Reverse Auction mechanism requires sellers to be present “virtually” during the auction session. Reverse Auctions
discourage sellers from delaying and prolonging the negotiation process, since this will only disadvantage the individual
seller. The seller can seal the deal easily with rival bidders should deliberate delays occur. Hence the buyer can benefit from
a streamlined supplier selection process. The Reverse Auction model also enables more up-to-date cost analysis to be made
from the perspective of the buyer. This benefit affects the negotiation phase (phase 4) of the Business Procurement Life
Cycle.
X. Ability to access a greater number of suppliers
Reverse Auctions involve less manual work in price negotiation. Reverse Auctions let the buyer evaluate offerings from many
suppliers at a lower cost. The bidding process enables the buyer to view a greater number of offerings, and to choose from
a wider selection. This benefit is expected to affect phases 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 of the Business Procurement Life Cycle.
Y. Ability to reduce procurement costs
Many organizations which have adopted Reverse Auctions were motivated by their ability to reduce buyer search cost.
Reverse Auctions reduce human-intensive and costly supplier selection. Reverse Auctions encourage sellers to compete
amongst themselves, reducing the need for the buyer to haggle with individual sellers. Compared to non-electronic
procurement methods, Reverse Auctions reduce paper-based offers and counter-offers, reducing communication costs
required for contacting sellers. Apart from phase 6, this benefit is expected to impact on every phase of Business Procurement
Life Cycle.
Z. Ability to purchase at market-determined price
Buying organizations can perform Reverse Auctions towards the end of existing contracts to ensure that they are continually
getting the greatest value for money contracts. Existing suppliers are motivated to optimize operations and pass on cost
savings and efficiencies to the buyer in a competitive market setting. Reverse Auctions increase cost and price transparencies,
enabling the buyer to purchase products at market-determined prices. This benefit is expected to be observed in phases 4 and
7 of the Business Procurement Life Cycle.
Table 2. Reverse Auction and Buyer Benefits
Buyer Benefits
Ability to standardize procurement and reduce maverick purchases
Ability to shorten the negotiation process
Ability to access a greater number of suppliers
Ability to reduce procurement costs
Ability to purchase at market-determined price

Code
V
W
X
Y
Z

The “Reverse Auction Stakeholder-Benefit Grid”
The aim of introducing the Reverse Auction Stakeholder-Benefit Grid is to aid understanding in how the Reverse Auction
mechanism impacts and improves various phases of business procurement.
This grid is constructed by anchoring elements of benefits from Tables 1 and 2 to the 7 phases of the Business Procurement Life
Cycle. Table 3 illustrates the current state of the Reverse Auction Stakeholder-Benefit Grid.
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Table 3. The Reverse Auction Stakeholder-Benefit Grid
Phases
1. Information gathering
2. Supplier contact
3. Background review
4. Negotiation
5. Fulfillment
6. Consumption, maintenance,
and disposal
7. Renewal

Seller Benefits
A, B
A, B
A, C,
A, C, D
E
E
A, B, C,

F

Buyer Benefits
V, X, Y
V, X, Y
V, X, Y
V, W, X, Y, Z
Y

X, Z

Anchoring individual stakeholder benefit element to the various phases of the Business Procurement Life Cycle enables
stakeholders to realize the roots of benefits. The grid highlights methods for optimizing these benefits. Nevertheless, the
stakeholder benefit lists may not be complete and future research may add or eliminate elements of stakeholder benefits. Empirical
evidence may also point to these different benefits being anchored to different phases of the Business Procurement Life Cycle.
For instance, the negotiation phase may experience seller benefits A, B, C, D and E, instead of benefits A, C and D at the present
time.

Methodology
This is an ongoing exploratory study using a series of real-life Reverse Auctions to investigate benefits to buyers and sellers using
the proposed Reverse Auction Stakeholder-Benefit Grid. An interpretivist approach is adopted since many of the concepts
highlighted may not be complete, and newer issues and challenges await future research. The interpretivist approach is based on
the belief that reality is subjective, a socially constructed product that is interpreted by humans as social actors according to our
beliefs and value systems such as language, consciousness and shared meanings (Neuman 1991; Lacity, 1994; Myers, 1997). Thus
different groups interpret situations differently. Interpretivist researchers aim to understand the phenomenon through assessment
of the meanings that humans assign to them (Orlikowski & Baroudi 1991). Interpretivist research aims to develop a deep
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation, and as such, the quality of the interpretivist work is measured by the
believability of the inferences drawn (Shanks, Rouse & Arnott 1993; Walsham 1995). Quantitative research relies on the
measurement of descriptive variables, to remove the effects of context, and to use inferential statistics in order to produce
generalizable and reproducible results (Kaplan & Duchon 1988). In the current study, the aim is not to test theory or measure any
descriptive variable from the data and thus quantitative methods were not adopted. Rather, resultant data was analyzed and
assimilated in order to draw logical implications. Qualitative research methods were chosen instead, in order to develop the
implications and suggestions from the data.
Qualitative research focuses on the meaning in the context or natural setting of the study, and is oriented towards exploration and
discovery where the researcher attempts to make sense of the situation (Patton 1990; Myers 1997). Categories and meanings
emerge from the data collected as the researcher develops an understanding of the situation (Kaplan & Duchon 1988). The
outcomes required by the researcher involve the discovery of important concepts, themes and implications.
It was thus considered appropriate to use an interpretivist framework to understand the relationships between suppliers and buyers
in the Reverse Auction business model in B2B electronic commerce.
An informal, semi-structured interview technique was used following the techniques developed and used by Kitwood (1980), and
Wilson and Arnold (1986). Non-directive questioning which is open-ended and acts as a stimulant for the subject’s thoughts, was
often used to make the subject feel at ease so that he/she would be able to give considered views and opinions rather than just
giving yes or no answers. The questions themselves emerged from an understanding of the constituent nature of the stakeholder
relationships (Corbitt 1997) garnered from existing literature and other research. Executives from the buying and selling
organizations who have participated in Reverse Auctions were interviewed. Confidentiality restrictions prevent details that may
lead to the identification of the participants be included in this paper. The series of Reverse Auctions were conducted by a financeoriented organization for the procurement of indirect materials and services.
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Discussion
Preliminary data collected from this study exposes some very interesting issues, particularly behavioral issues of the sellers.

Bidding Activity Intensifies in the Final Minutes the Auction Session
The normal duration of a Reverse Auction is set at sixty minutes. It was observed that only one or two bidders were willing to
place a bid early in the auction. Many bidders preferred to wait until the final ten to fifteen minutes before placing their bids.
This may be due to the fact that these sellers believed that by putting in an early bid, they would allow competitors to know their
operating cost and pricing strategy especially if they do not win the contract in the end. In most cases, bidding intensified towards
the end of the auction. At this time, many sellers hoped to clinch the deal by exploiting the element of time and surprise. They
place their best bids in the hope that competitors do not have the time to respond and counter them. This study found that the
winning bidder usually do not participate early in the auction.
This observation indicates that the Reverse Auction process benefits sellers provided they bid according to a strategy. By placing
bids towards the end of an auction, it becomes more difficult for competitors to counter-bid. On the other hand, Reverse Auctions
benefit the buyer as Reverse Auctions prevent sellers from using delay tactics to prolong the negotiation unnecessarily since a
time limit for the auction has been pre-determined. The extent to which Reverse Auctions improve the information gathering phase
of procurement may be limited by self-centered behavior of individual stakeholders.

Sellers are Willing to Match the Current Winning Bids Only
This observation was unexpected, as the Reverse Auction terms and conditions stated clearly that to win the auction, the bidder
has to place the best bid at the earliest instance. This phenomenon may be due to the fact that many sellers followed pricing
policies which emphasized price-matching. Bidders might only be willing to supply products at market determined-prices,
preferably without sacrificing their own profit margin by undercutting market price.
The phenomenon suggests that although Reverse Auction allows buyers to reach out to new suppliers, the process will only
intensify the competition if aggressive sellers are invited. Also, to make sellers bid more aggressively, the contract that is to be
tendered out should be of significant magnitude to attract their interests.

Sellers are Keen to Know Their Competitors
The Reverse Auction process allows bidders to see the current winning bid as well as the bid history, but not the identity of the
bidder. It was found that bidders were very interested to know whom they were bidding against. This is opposed to traditional
negotiation for procurement contracts, where the identity of the leading bidders, or current bidder, may be revealed. In the Reverse
Auction scenario, the identities of bidders are masked to prevent collusion amongst bidders.
This observation suggests that the introduction of new competition may exert pressure on existing sellers to improve their
offerings if the identity of the new supplier remains unknown. It highlights the alternatives available to the buyer, and at the same
time enables new sellers to benefit from bidding in a fair and structured process without being intimidated by competitors,
especially if there is a huge variation in organizational size.

Seller’s Enthusiasm in Participating in Reverse Auctions
An analysis across the different auction events revealed that industry culture may affect the enthusiasm of bidders. In some
industries, the sellers are keen to participate. They have little trouble in understanding the whole auctioning process. However,
some organizations from the more high-tech industries have actually shown a lack of enthusiasm, taking the auction for granted.
This may indicate that in some industries, the players have become complacent. Thus, it highlights the need for sellers to be
continually informed about potential benefits, and to believe that the threat of competition is real. For Reverse Auctions to attract
more attention from these bidders, the new contracts will have to be of significant value and size to generate interest. The buyer
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should encourage suppliers to get online by sticking to the rule, that is rewarding sellers who have participated and won in the
auction.
However, it is important to note that observation from this study is restricted by several constraints. One of these is the type of
procurement involved. Behavior of the buyer and seller may differ if Reverse Auctions are used for procuring direct materials.
Reverse Auctions are most suited for procuring supplies that can be commoditized easily, and yet incur the least switching costs.
Take for example, an automotive manufacturer using Reverse Auctions for selecting steel suppliers. Although steel has many
properties which allow it to be commoditized, traditionally, strong relationships between the automotive manufacturer and the
steel producer may have been built based on collaborative Just-In-Time manufacturing. Opting for a new steel supplier may be
uneconomical, but the threat of inviting new competition may actually encourage existing suppliers to improve their operations,
and share benefits from leaner production with their customers.
In general, Reverse Auctions introduce a level of competition that motivates sellers to operate leaner production and to provide
more aggressively packaged offerings. Reverse Auctions encourage the buyer to purchase from these sellers, giving them an
opportunity to standout from the crowd.
Apart from that, sellers participating in Reverse Auctions are encouraged to make their cost structures and pricing strategies
transparent to customers and competitors when they place a bid. This can potentially allow competitors to replicate their strategies
and undercut them. But on a more positive note, this may instead convince the buyer that the seller operates a lean and efficient
production. It may indicate that the supplier has an honest pricing regime, and is ever willing to pass on such benefits to the buyer.
The Reverse Auction process allows these sellers to put themselves in the spotlight, emphasizing their strengths, without of
shedding too much light on their operations. Ultimately Reverse Auctions benefit both buyers and sellers.

Conclusion
Research into Reverse Auctions is still in its infancy. Although Reverse Auctions currently share many similarities with traditional
multi-lateral negotiations, Reverse Auctions’ strength lies in enabling organizations to buy and sell in a dynamic marketspace,
at market-determined prices. In attempting to shed light on the Reverse Auction process, this study also suggests directions for
future research. For example, future studies may benefit from using a Transaction Cost Theory approach for understanding the
adoption and implementation of Reverse Auctions. Concepts from research in Virtual Organization may be applied to Reverse
Auctions to understand implementation issues associated with real-time, distributed business processes.
Lately, B2B Electronic Commerce activities have also attracted the attention of competition watchdogs. Challenges to existing
competition legislation may arise when a consortium of organizations collaborates to purchase using a Reverse Auction and in
the process, exploit sellers who are mainly Small and Medium Enterprises. Should competition watchdogs, then, pay more
attention to sellers, and not only act on behalf of consumers? Practitioners may be interested in knowing how Small and Medium
Enterprises who are not capable of holding Reverse Auctions themselves, will change their procurement habit should their
competitors adopt Reverse Auctions.
This paper intends to increase organizational awareness of Reverse Auction benefits. Although many organizations have started
using Reverse Auctions for purchasing supplies in recent years, very few recognize that it requires proper implementation
strategies to ensure its continuous effectiveness in lowering cost structure and reflecting on market-determined pricing. By
understanding the potential benefits of Reverse Auctions from the perspective of various stakeholders, organizations participating
in a Reverse Auction event can better prepare themselves to use this procurement tool to their own advantage. The Reverse
Auction Stakeholder-Benefit Grid framework contributes to future research in Reverse Auctions, and to B2B Electronic Commerce
as a whole by identifying phases of business processes which can benefit from ICT implementation, and for tying such benefits
to the relevant stakeholder.
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